An international workshop on animal ethics will take place in Tartu

Associate Professor of Ancient Philosophy, University of Tartu, Department of Philosophy

Extending Ethical Concern to Non-Human Animals: Porphyry vs Stoics

I examine Porphyry’s argument for extending ethical concern to non-human animals in his treatise On Abstinence from Killing Animals, with particular attention to his criticism of the Stoic position, which denies animals such concern. I ask whether the Stoics are vulnerable to this criticism and how Porphyry’s account of the ethical status of animals departs from theirs.

PhD Candidate and Research Fellow at GRK 2638 “Critique, Normativity, Change“, Freie Universität Berlin, Institute of

Philosophy Relations to Nature in Kant’s Doctrine of Right

The presentation examines how Kant’s doctrine of right is structured by a double relation to nature. On the one hand, as has often been argued, Kant’s concept of property is oriented toward the domination of nature, both in its abstract and purely intersubjective form. Within this framework, nature appears as the rightless other of juridical subjects and as an object of their unlimited disposal. On the other hand, I argue that Kant’s doctrine of right can be understood as a realization of freedom only if the concept of right itself reflects a fundamental dependency on nature. Starting from Kant’s notion of force, I show that freedom realizes itself only in an external reality and therefore depends on the conditions of that reality. On this basis, I argue that right must be understood as a form of mediation between freedom and nature, and that Kant’s doctrine of right remains abstract insofar as it provides only an abstract form of this mediation.

Associate Professor of Political Theory, University of Leicester

Care as a fitting attitude towards sentient life

This paper argues that caring for and about a being with a welfare requires treating it as an end-in itself. Claims to care for sentient beings while causing serious harm for personal benefit demonstrate a failure to appreciate the kind of value they possess. Second, the paper argues that we ought to care for beings with a welfare for their own sakes. The paper shows that claims from farmers or scientists to care deeply about their animals are ill-fitting with appropriate forms of care. Goodness and the demands of practical rationality rule out seriously harming sentient beings.

Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy, University of Tartu, Department of Philosophy

The Role of Self-knowledge in Animal Ethics: An Ability Account Perspective

Self-knowledge is traditionally conceptualised as being linked to language, a theoretical framework that renders it inaccessible to non-human animals. I argue that by adopting an ability account perspective, I can provide an argument in support of animal self-knowledge. The acknowledgement of a functional monitor in non-human animals would allow us to broaden our understanding of animal
minds, as well as to improve animal welfare.

Adjunct Full Professor (DP Applied Informatics) & Chief Researcher (Full Professor equivalent), Kaunas University of Technology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities

The Philosophy of Moral Status

This paper examines the philosophy of moral status by analysing the concept through three prominent frameworks: the capacities-based approach, the social-relational approach, and hybrid
accounts. The first part reconstructs how moral status has traditionally been linked to intrinsic features such as sentience, rationality, and autonomy, highlighting both the normative appeal and the epistemic difficulties of measuring these capacities in, for example, marginal human cases. The second part reviews relational theories that ground status in being cherished and embedded in a
lifeworld, and it questions their vulnerability to shifting attitudes and problems of justificatory circularity. The third part applies these insights to concrete cases—animals, robots, and persons with severe mental impairments—in order to formulate a more sophisticated hybrid methodology. I argue that only an account combining agency-relevant properties with relations of reciprocal responsibility can explain graduated protection while avoiding speciesism and the reduction of moral worth to a
single principle.

Professor of Biosemiotics, University of Tartu, Department of Semiotics

Born into Green, Staying Alive

There is no long-term way to live in species-rich ecosystems without choosing degrowth. Why is that
and what does it mean in practice? Let’s make it understood and accepted