Dylan Bailey and Nona Kiknadze’s Presentation on Rethinking Death and Suicide

On Friday, 25 April at 14:15, an English-language colloquium took place at the University of Tartu’s Philosophicum (Jakobi 2–336), exploring the links between suicide, considered decision-making, and the stigma surrounding mental health.

The presentation, titled „Rethinking Death and Suicide in a Life Worth Living: A Contextualist Approach to Death,
Suicidal Ideation, and the Value of Life“, challenged the common assumption that suicidal thoughts are always irrational and indicative of mental illness. Drawing on existentialist philosophy and critical psychotherapy, the talk proposed a perspective in which some individuals may arrive at a clearly reasoned and rational decision to end their life. The aim was to foster a more compassionate and nuanced discussion about end-of-life decisions.

The presentation was delivered by Dylan Bailey, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of South Florida, and Nona Kiknadze, a doctoral student in counselling psychology at the University of Miami.

Colloquium Summary

„This talk explores the intersections of suicide, epistemic rationality, and destigmatization. We challenge prevailing assumptions in medical ethics and mental health discourse—namely, that suicidal ideation is inherently epistemically irrational and symptomatic of mental illness. Drawing on existential philosophy (particularly Nietzsche and Camus), Foucaultian critique, and existential psychotherapy, we argue for a contextualist, libertarian approach to suicidal ideation, which recognises that some individuals may arrive at a rational and authentic decision to end their lives in alignment with a coherent value system.

We critique the overmedicalization of depression, the stigmatisation of non-normative attitudes toward death, and the monolithic application of the principle of beneficence in clinical contexts, especially when it overrides patient autonomy. In this talk, we focus on a key application of our theoretical framework: the moral and philosophical distinction often made between physical and psychological pain in the context of assisted suicide. We question whether this distinction is ethically defensible, especially given that chronic psychological suffering can stem from stable, epistemically rational evaluations of one’s life. By reconsidering this distinction, we aim to contribute to a more nuanced and compassionate discourse around end-of-life decisions and mental health ethics.“

The presentation is available to watch later

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Open series of colloquia in spring 2025

This colloquium is part of the Susimetsa Philosophicum Residency Programme, where the residents present the results of their research projects. The colloquium is organised by the Department of Philosophy and the Centre for Ethics of the University of Tartu. The colloquium is supported by the NGO Prof. Dr. Theda Rehbock's Susimetsa Philosophicum.